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Hospital Privileges
Bernard D. Herring*
C ONDITIONS OF MODERN MEDICINE make it almost imperative
that the physician have a hospital in which he may practice;
on the other hand, the hospital cannot exist without its medical
staff. The alleviation of human suffering and the restoration of
health regardless of the patient's financial status is the common
cause of both the hospital and the physician. In essence a mutual
partnership is formed, in which definite obligations to the other
and the community, which both are serving, are accepted.
The governing body of the hospital is the servant of the
community in which the hospital operates. Probably its most
important responsibility is to provide a medical staff and to
make certain that it conforms to certain standards which the
community has a right to expect. As a corollary of this function,
the governing body has the power to appoint a qualified medical
staff and to remove those who are unqualified or who fail to com-
ply with the reasonable rules and regulations of the hospital. As
one might expect, there has been a rising tide of litigation chal-
lenging the rights of the governing board.
Whatever the scope of discretion residing in the governing
body, courts usually require that it affirmatively exercise such
discretion and not delegate or abandon it to other parties. This
applies to both private and public hospital governing boards. In
the Ware case,' involving a public hospital governing board, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas held it unreasonable to require
membership in the county medical society as a condition to a
physician's practice in the hospital, because this would constitute
an unlawful delegation of powers to the county medical society.'
The court agreed that the public hospital may adopt rules that
guarantee the safety, interest and welfare of the patients and
the general public, but held that its governing body cannot ex-
clude a physician by rules that are arbitrary and capricious.
The membership rule was found arbitrary because the medical
* M.D., L.L.B., F.C.L.M.; of Canton, Ohio. [Paper presented at the Ameri-
can College of Legal Medicine, New York City, June 20, 1965.]
1 Ware v. Benedict, 225 Ark. 185, 280 S.W. 2d 234 (1955).
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society could reject applications for membership for no reason
at all.2
The Greisman case involved a private non-profit hospital's
right to delegate responsibility respecting staff membership to
a private organization.3 A court held invalid a hospital's by-law,
requiring membership in a county medical society and gradua-
tion from an approved medical school as conditions for staff mem-
bership. The plaintiff, an osteopath, had unrestricted license to
practice medicine and surgery in the state of New Jersey. The
hospital refused to permit him to file an application for member-
ship on the courtesy staff. In so doing the hospital did not ques-
tion the osteopath's professional or personal qualifications but
based its actions solely on the fact that the osteopath did not
qualify under its bylaws. Since it is a private institution, the
hospital considered its staff admission policies to be discretion-
ary. However, the court said that although the hospital is pri-
vate in the sense that it is non-governmental, it is not private in
other respects. The hospital is dedicated to the vital public pur-
pose of serving the sick and injured. A great part of its funds
come from public sources and through public solicitation; it is
exempt from taxation because of its non-profit and public as-
pects. The court considered the restrictive bylaw as an arbitrary
and therefore invalid exercise of the hospital's fiduciary power.
Procedural fairness in general will be determined by the
hospital board's adherence or lack of adherence to its own rules
and regulations. 4 When the board has the uncontrolled discre-
tion of granting, withholding or withdrawing of privileges, the
board is under no obligation to grant a hearing,3 and if one is
granted the court need not consider whether it was fair.6 Never-
theless, when a hospital's rules and regulations provide for notice
and hearing, then the courts do require the hospital to abide by
2 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc., 34 N. J. 582, 170 A. 2d 791
(1961). As to associational rights generally, see, Oleck, Non-Profit Corps.,
Orgs. & Assns., chap. 25 (2d ed., 1965, now in press).
3 Griesman v. Newcomb Hospital, 40 N. J. 389, 192 A. 2d 817 (1963).
4 Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hospital District, 174 Col. App. 2d 709, 345 P. 2d
93 (1959).
5 Akopiantz v. Board of County Commissioners, 65 N. M. 125, 333 P. 2d 611
(1958).
6 Dayan v. Wood River Township Hospital, 118 Ill. App. 2d 263, 152 N.E. 2d
205 (1958).
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its own rules. 7 In its ruling in the Rosner case, the California
Supreme Court established that a Board of the district hospital
could not act capriciously and arbitrarily in denial of staff privi-
leges to plaintiff because he was not "temperamentally suitable
for hospital staff practice." 8 The Court ruled that the Board had
exceeded its statutory authority in excluding the doctor. The
trouble had resulted from disagreement as to treatment of pa-
tients, the doctor's criticism of hospital personnel and practices,
and his appearance in liability suits as a witness. The Court held
that the denial of staff privileges in the district would have the
effect of denying the doctor the right to exercise his profession.
Procedural rights are invoked when there is a question of
denial of right or privilege of caring for the physician's own pa-
tient in the hospital,9 denial of reappointment,10 or when an at-
tempt is made to remove a physician from the staff." Rarely are
procedural rights involved in consideration of original staff ap-
pointments.
The denial of privilege to practice medicine may be consid-
ered as a restraint of trade. In the Willis case, a California osteo-
path alleged that the hospital trustees, certain osteopaths and
certain doctors of medicine had combined and conspired to pre-
vent him and other osteopaths who moved into the county in
which the hospital was located from practising the profession of
osteopathy. On appeal, this was found to be a cause of action.1 2
The court repudiated, however, any suggestion that doctors may
not join together in good faith to advance the ethics of their pro-
fessions and the cause of good health, even if in the process some
doctors might suffer restriction of access to hospital practices.
Recently the fundamental question, "Do hospital patients
have rights?" has come up. Do adults, in full control of their
mental faculties, have the right to refuse certain types of medical
7 Khoury v. Community Memorial Hospital, 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E. 2d 533
(1962).
8 Rosner v. Eden Township Hospital District, 25 Cal. Rpt. 551, 375 P. 2d 431
(1962).
9 Alpert v. Board of Governors of City Hospital, 286 App. Div. 542, 145
N.Y.S. 2d 534 (1955).
10 Supra n. 6.
11 Johnson v. City of Ripon, 259 Wis. 84, 47 N.W. 2d 328 (1951).
12 Willis v. Santa Anna Community Hospital, 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P. 2d 431
(1962).
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treatment which doctors recommend? In particular does this
issue arise in connection with Jehovah's Witnesses.
One case involved a twenty-five year old married woman
who was treated by a Georgetown Hospital for a ruptured
ulcer.'3 The attending doctors determined that she would die if
she did not receive blood transfusions, but would have a 50 per
cent chance of living if she did. Since both the patient and her
husband were Jehovah's Witnesses, neither would consent to
transfusion, which is contrary to their religious beliefs (Genesis
9:4, Leviticus 7:26, 17:14, Acts 15:20, 29). After a federal dis-
trict court refused to issue an order authorizing blood transfu-
sion to an adult patient without her or her husband's consent, a
judge of the United States Court of Appeals went to the hospital
and talked to the patient, her husband and physicians. He then
issued a temporary order, authorizing the administration of such
transfusions as physicians deemed necessary to save the patient's
life. The transfusions were administered. Later the patient peti-
tioned for rehearing of the application for the order. On Feb. 3,
1964, the Court of Appeals, by a majority judgment, with four of
the nine judges dissenting, dismissed the petition on the grounds
that the patient's recovery deprived the dispute of any practical
consequences. The dissenting judges were most outspoken in
their disagreement. Judge Miller pointed out that no single
judge of the Court of Appeals had the power to act alone. Judge
Burger, in a separate dissenting opinion, submitted that while
courts have a proper function in their allotted area, they are not
entitled to manage peoples' private affairs.
A recent Illinois case involved a 39 year old female patient
with a bleeding peptic ulcer. When she became unconscious
from loss of blood, her physician, who had been treating her for
two years and was fully aware of her religious beliefs, decided
that a transfusion was imperative. He testified that the patient
would die within 24 hours if she did not receive the transfusion.
The trial court appointed a "conservator," who authorized the
blood transfusions in behalf of the patient. Following her release
from the hospital the patient and her husband sought to have the
court order voided as a matter of principle. Patient urged that
she had been denied the right to freedom of religion, discrimi-
Is Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.
2d 1000 (D.C., Cir., 1964).
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nated against and placed in the position of a "second class citi-
zen" who was not allowed the right of free exercise of religion,
enjoyed by all others and, on the basis of her physician's con-
trary opinions, deprived of her right to be "let alone." She
pointed out that she had signed a release freeing both the physi-
cian and the hospital from liability for any consequences that
might result from her refusal to submit to blood transfusion.
The probate court dismissed the petition of the patient and her
husband on the ground that the proceedings were moot.
However, when the case came to the state supreme court on
appeal, the tribunal decided otherwise.1 4 It held that "even
though we might consider (the patient's) beliefs unwise, foolish
or ridiculous, in the absence of overriding danger to society we
may not interfere." Thus there appears to be growing awareness
by the judiciary of individual rights of patients and their right
to reject an accepted form of therapy. Recently a 21 year old
married woman delivered a healthy baby but subsequently de-
veloped massive uterine bleeding, necessitating an emergency
hysterectomy. The hemoglobin was checked several times at 1.5
Gms. and hematocrit 5.5%. Patient and her husband were ad-
vised of her extremely precarious condition. Though semicoma-
tose and cyanotic she adamantly refused blood transfusion, be-
cause of religious convictions. This patient survived without
blood transfusion and is enjoying good health today. To some
this kind of religious conviction is foolhardy and unwise. How-
ever, persons with faith and integrity have often been misunder-
stood, chided and persecuted, sometimes even by legal author-
ities. Do our staff privileges, which are so sacred to us, grant us
the right to deny to individuals their religious rights when they
clash with accepted medical therapy? Indeed, there are judicial
decisions to the effect that we do not have the right or privilege
(on the basis of our medical knowledge) to deny a competent
adult the right to follow his religious convictions, even though
death may be imminent.
Finally, racial discrimination has been linked with staff
privileges or the lack of them. In the Simkins case the plaintiffs
were Negro physicians, dentists and patients seeking an injunc-
tion to restrain the Moses H. Cone Hospital from continuing to
14 Brooks, Estate v. Brooks, 32 Il. 2d 361, 205 N.E. 2d 435 (1965).
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deny to Negro physicians and dentists the use of staff privileges
and from continuing to deny admission of patients on the basis
of race. 15 Too, plaintiff asked that, portions of the Hill-Burton
Act, permitting separate but equal facilities, be declared uncon-
stitutional.
In the District Court the issue revolved around whether or
not the defendants were instrumentalities of the government.
The court concluded that the separate but equal clause in the
Hill-Burton Act was not in issue because the hospital did not
claim the right to discriminate, and held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not require it to grant staff privileges. This
decision was appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals propounded the legal
question in a different manner-whether state or federal govern-
ment or both had become so involved in the conduct of these
hospitals that their activities are also the activities of these gov-
ernments, without the hospitals necessarily becoming their in-
strumentality in a strict sense. On Nov. 1, 1963, the Circuit
Court ordered the District Court to grant the requested injunc-
tion in the Simkins case, and held that those provisions in the
Hill-Burton Act undertaking to authorize segregation by state
connected institutions were unconstitutional. Under the Hill-
Burton Act the Long Hospital had received almost $2 million in
public monies and the Cone Hospital about $1 million for con-
struction purposes.
Almost daily, judicial decisions are handed down, affecting
the practice of medicine. As a consequence the rights and re-
sponsibilities of physicians are in a state of flux. We must remain
vigilant and view these changes critically but objectively, realiz-
ing that there will be a constant need for evaluation of these
changing legal concepts, especially as they relate to staff privi-
leges, for such privileges are in no small way associated with
such highly volatile subjects as procedural fairness, restraint of
trade, religious freedom, and racial discrimination.
15 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959 (4th Cir.,
1963).
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